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REHABILITATION, REDISTRIBUTION OR
DISSIPATION: THE EVIDENCE FOR CHOOSING
AMONG BANKRUPTCY HYPOTHESES
JAMES W. BOWERS*
It is important to know why we adopt any particular statute or rule. The
language in which we must express our rules has limitations, and the
number of possible future circumstances in which the rule may arguably be
relevant is very large. One of the fundamental skills of lawyering involves
interpreting any rule so that it achieves the purposes for which it was
adopted, and is applied only at the time and in the circumstances it was
meant to address and in ways likely to achieve the intended effects.
Bankruptcy law has been a staple feature of the American legal landscape
for almost 100 years. It is slowly becoming apparent, however, that
nobody really understands why we have adopted bankruptcy legislation.
Before 1980, bankruptcy policy was regarded as fundamentally
distributional: it was thought to exist principally in an equality principle.'
Even much recent bankruptcy scholarship consists of analysis of doctrine
to determine whether it is consistent with that principle.2 In 1981,
however, Thomas Jackson developed the argument that bankruptcy could
best be understood as a response to inefficiencies created by the operation
of nonbankruptcy creditors' remedies under which every creditor is
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. I have chewed over various ideas
in this paper with Michael Bradley, John Church, D. Bruce Johnsen, Andy Kleit, Dean Lueck, Lucy
McGough, Michael Rosenzweig, and Myron Slovin, so much that I can no longer identify which of
them inspired which thought. I regret creating the confusion which results in denial to them of the
credit they are individually due, and willingly shoulder the blame for the errors they could not prevent
me from committing. Conversations I had with Bill Whitford and Steve Kaplan were also very helpful
to me. Thanks, folks.
I. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 75 (1973) (identifying equality of distribution as a
foundational principle of bankruptcy law); 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 45.2 (1965) (same).
2. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of
Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic- Waste
Cleanup, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 119 (applying the equality principle as between
present and future claimants); Charles Jordon Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REV. 981
(1992) (arguing that even payments made in the ordinary course of business ought to be regarded as
voidable preferences in deference to the equality principle).
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potentially subjected to external costs imposed by the behavior of other
creditors.3 Over the next decade, however, the insight that bankruptcy
could be understood as a product of concerns over economic efficiency
began to be undermined. In a series of seminal works,4 Jackson and his
collaborator, Douglas Baird, showed that discrete applications of the
existing Bankruptcy Code failed to take the form that the efficiency
hypothesis predicted.
As of about 1990, then, there were two competing academic visions of
bankruptcy law which shared a belief that bankruptcy law was basically
justifiable. Some believed that efficiency was an attractive justification for
bankruptcy law, and were, therefore, inclined to argue that the existing
statute and its interpretation had simply gone wrong. Since a bankruptcy
policy was, in principle, efficient, all that was needed was some tinkering
with our actual statute in order to fix up the inefficient anomalies.
Business bankruptcies, after all, were the focus of much of this academic
attention, and efficiency arguments seemed to have a natural affinity with
corporate and commercial matters such as those addressed by bankruptcy
legislation.
Others remained comfortable with the traditional distributive view, and
were inclined to be unconcerned with whether bankruptcy law was efficient
or not. When confronted with the tension between the existing law and the
ethics of efficiency, most bankruptcy teachers simply opted for the law and
assumed that even though they were inefficient, because the bankruptcy
doctrines existed, they were also somehow justified.
Late in the 1980s and early in the 1990s, the basic agreement that
bankruptcy law could be justified (or even well understood) began to
unravel. The underpinnings of the original conclusion (that bankruptcy
could, in principle, be seen as a response to a suboptimal nonbankruptcy
remedies system) were continually reexamined and called into question,5
3. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors' Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (arguing that multiple creditors racing to collect out of the debtor's assets
create a classic common pool problem which is solved by bankruptcy law's creation of a mandatory
collective remedy).
4. See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986);
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY
(1985).
5. See, e.g, Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 (1986); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990)
[hereinafter Bowers, Murphy 1]; James W. Bowers, Whither iat Hits the Fan: Murphy's Law,
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27 (1991)
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until the proposition that there could be an efficiency principle underlying
bankruptcy began to lose its credibility. Members of the first camp began
to conclude that given its obvious defects, the case for bankruptcy law had
become so weakened that drastic overhaul or even outright repeal ought to
be considered.6 This view actually hit the headlines in the financial and
popular presses7 when the results of one empirical study (by Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig) seemed to show that investors had been made
much worse off by the adoption of the 1978 Code.'
That the scholarship of the late '80s and early '90s tended to show that
Chapter 11 was both theoretically and empirically inefficient did not
discourage the Chapter's defenders. One critic of the Bradley and
Rosenzweig empirical study,9 for example, urged that the findings Bradley
and Rosenzweig had reported simply be ignored,"0 even though many of
their most significant findings replicated those of other financial studies."
Even granting that Chapter II appears to have disastrous consequences for
investors, Professor Warren, along with other critics, also argued that
Chapter 1 l's apparent punishment of investors does not undermine its
ultimate utility because other stakeholders may have gained more than
investors lost.' This study addresses that new redistributive view of
bankruptcy in its two most typical versions-which I denominate the
[hereinafter Bowers, Murphy 11].
6. See generally Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439
(1992); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofAmerican Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 311 (1993); Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811 (1994); Baird,
supra note 5; Bowers, Murphy I, supra note 5; Bowers, Murphy II, supra note 5; Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Robert K.
Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization:
A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IowA L. REv. 669, 671 n.14 (1993) (collecting references to
articles in the financial press); Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley & Rosenzweig, 91 MIcn. L. REV. 79, 80 nn.5-6 (1992) (same). These issues have
been heard in the popular press as well, including the front page of the New York Times. Critics of
Bankruptcy Law See Inefficiency and Waste, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at Al.
8. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 6.
9. Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992).
10. Id. at 439.
11. See Truman A. Clark & Mark I. Weinstein, The Behavior of the Common Stock of Banknpt
Firms. 38 J. FIN. 489 (1983) (reporting results of event study showing significant abnormal negative
returns to securities of firms making bankruptcy announcements); Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt
Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
315 (1990) (same); Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority
Rule, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 1457 (1990) (same).
12. Warren, supra note 9, at 467.
1994]
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"Rehabilitative" and "Pure Redistribution" hypotheses, respectively-and
argues that neither is consistent with the existing empirical data concerning
corporate reorganizations. It then proposes a new thesis about bankruptcy
which is inspired not only by the existing data, but also by new theoretical
insights: that measures which avoid some kinds of market failures, such as
externalities, entail their own kinds of costs, e.g., by fostering holdout
behavior.'3 The new thesis-that bankruptcy law tends to waste resourc-
es-I denominate the "Dissipative" thesis.
I. THE REHABILITATIVE HYPOTHESIS
Chapter lI 's defenders are often vague about which stakeholders
received the gains that offset the losses that Chapter 11 imposed on
investors. More commonly, scholars who support the stakeholder benefit
position assert that Chapter 11 was meant to avoid the liquidation of
financially distressed businesses, thus preserving a valuable feeling of
community and security in the minds of the firm's employees, suppliers
and customers. 4 These, we are left to surmise, are the beneficiary
stakeholders and benefits of a policy to rehabilitate businesses.
The rehabilitative hypothesis is not necessarily redistributional. It has
been urged on grounds that sound like arguments for allocative economic
efficiency. For example, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code
suggests that rehabilitation tends to keep assets specialized to an industry,
in their best uses, instead of permitting them to gravitate to inferior uses
when they are sold for scrap. 15  The most generalized efficiency claim
travelling under the guise of a rehabilitation hypothesis is the traditional
"going-concern value" theory, recently readvocated by Theodore Eisenberg
13. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987)
(arguing that the Trust Indenture Act's prohibition of bondholder votes on core terms distorts holdouts
in a bond workout). But see Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 595 (1993) (arguing that parties could contract out of the holdout problem if they were permitted
to opt out of the Bankruptcy Code).
14. See, eg., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganizatlon
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 603 (1993). See also Donald R.
Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 54 1,
552-58 (1993) (urging this role for Chapter 11); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at 1043.44
(discussing the evidence from the legislative history that Congress intended Chapter II to serve
rehabilitative purposes in order to save jobs and troubled businesses from being liquidated).
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and Shoichi Tagashira, 6 which justifies Bankruptcy's corporate reorgani-
zation provisions on the grounds that even bankrupt firms are worth more
as going concerns than their assets are worth when liquidated piecemeal.
Since under nonbankruptcy creditors' remedies law, and even under
Chapter 7, assets are liquidated, it follows from this theory, a
nonliquidating remedy, such as a corporate reorganization, is justifiable
because it is likely to return more to claimants as a group. The size of
those extra returns is, in theory, at least equal to the going-concem value
saved when the liquidation is avoided.
The claim that Chapter 11 saves going-concern values generates a
prediction that markets ought to value firms which are eventually liquidated
less than firms which are reorganized, and indeed, the only study available
which collects such data seems to indicate that to be the case. A recent
event study 7 of the market's reaction to the Chapter 11 filing announce-
ments of 81 firms taking Chapter 11 between 1979 and 1991 which
eventually reorganized in Chapter 11 found that investors lost about 25%
of their equity value in the three-day window ending on the day of the
filing announcement. In contrast, the loss to equity of the 20 firms whose
cases were eventually converted to Chapter 7 liquidations was almost 40%.
It would be wrong to conclude from these findings that if going-concern
value was saved, however, that Chapter 11 deserves the credit. The same
study disaggregated the above findings into two groups: losses to firms
which attracted bids in the market for corporate control during their
Chapter 11 proceedings, and those which reorganized on a stand-alone
basis, without ever having been bid for. The event window losses to firms
which reorganized on a stand-alone basis without receiving a market bid
were statistically indistinguishable from the losses suffered by investors in
the firms which liquidated. The clear implication of these findings is that
if there is any going-concern value, it is not Chapter 11 which saves it; the
only thing that saves going-concern values, when they exist, is the financial
market.
16. Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence
From Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. I 11 (1994). This study reports Japanese officials' estimates of going-
concern values for small firms undergoing composition proceedings in Japan. Id. at 134. The estimated
surpluses are so large that, the authors conclude, creditors in Japan experience gains even if only a small
percentage of the debtor firms actually perform the obligations under their plans. Id. at 144. The study
does not report any market valuations of the surpluses, however, and acknowledges that the estimates
are subject to variability among estimators unrelated to financial concerns. Id. at 126-30.
17. Myron B. Slovin et al., Bankruptcy Resolution, Creditors Holding Private Debt and the Market
for Corporate Control: Market-Based Evidence from Chapter 11 Filing Announcements (Sept. 11,
1994) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
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An even more general, yet similar, sort of claim is made by Lynn
LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren. They suggest that firms which must use
markets to weather their financial storms, must pay the high transaction
costs which exist in our highly imperfect real world markets. Even if there
is no going-concern value to be saved, they argue that claimants are made
better off as a group if an administrative remedy is found for their
problems which, because it permits bankrupt firms to stay out of those
expensive markets, does not necessitate incurring those high transaction
costs." Under this view, Chapter 11 can be justified as an efficiency
measure because it prevents firms and their assets from being liquidated at
low prices, or sold in markets which, because of their imperfections,
impose high transaction costs. 9
This efficiency view of the possible rehabilitative goals to be served by
the enactment of Chapter 11 predicts that the residual claimants of those
firms which take Chapter 11 but are not put into play in markets (and
therefore, are not subjected to the high transaction costs that the efficiency
version of the rehabilitative argument posits) will fare better than similar
claimants of firms which are in play. My colleagues' event study 0 of the
market's reaction to the Chapter 11 filing announcements produced results
that conflict with the high-transaction-cost market hypothesis. Bids for
control of forty-seven of those firms were made in the Chapter 11 proceed-
ings-putting the bankrupt firm "in play" in the market for corporate
control. In the three days ending with the Chapter 11 filing announcements
of those firms, however, their shareholders suffered abnormal returns which
were forty percent greater (less negative) than the returns to firms which
were not put "in play" in their eventual Chapter 11 proceedings. 2 1 Thus,
the market not only seems to predict which firms will be put on the market,
but it also appears to predict that the firms put on the market will lose less
of their value than those that do not receive bids for control during their
reorganization and so. are spared the expensive opportunity of market
participation.22
18. LoPucki, supra note 7, at 109; Warren, supra note 9, at 474.
19. There is an implicit assumption in this type of argument that the alternative to tile markets,
i.e., bankruptcy judges and procedures, are relatively free of any bureaucratic equivalent of transaction
costs. See James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic Cost-School of
Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1773 (1993).
20. Slovin et al., supra note 17.
21. Returns were -21% for the firms receiving bids, but -36% for those whose Chapter II
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Even when markets, high transaction costs and all, intervene to assist the
owners of bankrupt firms, however, they apparently do not save those
owners from harms which Chapter 11 itself imposes on them. Owners of
firms which are bid for in the unregulated market for corporate control do
better than do the owners of firms bid for in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Because in the normal market bidders must compete with each other in
order to acquire target firms, the value of bidder firms does not increase
(and indeed, normally falls) as a result of the bidding.23 Obstacles which
Chapter 11 apparently puts in the way of bidders trying to acquire firms in
bankruptcy, however, result in positive abnormal returns to the bidding
firms. Chapter 11 apparently discourages potential competition among
bidding firms and thus awards gains to bidders that exceed the normal
competitive return bidders earn in unobstructed markets. While in those
markets, the target company's shareholders capture the gains that result
from the bidding, in Chapter 11, the bankrupt firm's owners must share
more of the gains with the bidder. In other words, the Chapter 11 process
itself imposes higher transaction costs than the unobstructed market
imposes.
On the other hand, advocates of the rehabilitative purposes of Chapter 11
have also framed their arguments in distributive terms. The U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, has suggested that bankruptcy law historically was
intended to benefit certain stakeholders at the cost of secured creditors. 4
Professor Elizabeth Warren has advanced an explicitly redistributive view
of bankruptcy policy." Most of us have also met a bankruptcy lawyer
who feels strongly that insolvent businesses ought to be kept afloat for as
long as senior creditors can be milked for the costs of doing so.26
23. Id. at 22.
24. In United Savings Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd. (In re Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.), 484 U.S. 365, 373 (1988), the Court spoke to the claim by a secured
creditor that the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code should not be construed to give
unsecured claimants, in effect, an involuntary, interest-free loan of the collateral for the period of the
bankruptcy proceedings: "Section 506(b)'s denial of postpetition interest to undersecured creditors
merely codified pre-Code bankruptcy law, in which that denial was part of the conscious allocation of
reorganization benefits and losses between undersecured and unsecured creditors." Id.
25. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 353 (1993) [hereinafter
Warren, Policymaking] ("Equality-and deliberate deviations from equality-stand at the center of
bankruptcy policy.").
26. This is a plausible interpretation of the argument made by Professor Gross in this Symposium.
Karen Gross, The Need to Take Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1031 (1994).
19941
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All legal rules have both efficiency and distributional consequences that
are not always easy to separate from each other,27 so it is unimportant
whether the rehabilitation hypothesis is classified in either category. The
evidence shows that Chapter 11 is not very successful either in rehabilitat-
ing businesses or in sparing them the necessity of having to resort to capital
and asset markets. The best that two of rehabilitation's most prominent
defenders have been able to say is that "Chapter 11 is not a complete
failure."2 Professors LoPucki and Whitford studied all of the Chapter 11
cases of firms with $100 million in assets filing for and emerging from
Chapter 11 in the first decade of the Bankruptcy Code. The findings upon
which they base their conclusion are summarized below in Table I:
TABLE I
The LoPucki and Whitford Data Recapitulated
Total Number of Firms Studied: ........................ 43
Less:
Firms totally liquidated in Chapter 11 ............... 5
Firms substantially liquidated except for NOLs ......... 6
Firms which "shattered" in Chapter 11 ............. 1329
Non-shattered firms sold to third parties in Chapter 11 .. 130
Firms which shattered immediately after confirmation .... 3
Non-shattered firms which refiled within 5 years ...... 51
Firms for which information was not available ......... 1
Total ................................... 34
Firms apparently unqualifiedly rehabilitated in Chapter 11:32 ..... 9
27. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
329 (1993); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1212 (1991) (examining the distributive and efficiency aspects of pareto optimality).
28. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 14, at 611 (emphasis added).
29. LoPucki and Whitford classify a firm as "shattered" if its "core business" fails to survive
Chapter I I in a largely intact condition. Id. at 602. They list 18 companies as "shattered" in their
Appendix 2 at page 615. I arrived at 13, however, by eliminating five firms which they also list as
having liquidated (FSC, KDT, Seatrain Lines, Technical Equities, and Sambo's Restaurants). I am
especially grateful to Professor Whitford for saving me the embarrassment of overlooking this potential
double counting.
30. LoPucki and Whitford, supra note 14, at 603 n.21, observe that seven firms were sold to third
parties. Six of this number, however, overlap the number already listed as liquidated in this table. The
only firm which was sold off but not listed as liquidated was Energetics, which is the firm I list here.
31. The "non-shattered" classification comes from Part A of LoPucki and Whitford, supra note
14, app. 2, at 615, and the refilers are listed at 608 n.42. The refilers are Continental Airlines, Wilson
Foods, Salant, Anglo Energy, and Lionel.
32. This figure should probably be regarded as a maximum since LoPucki and Whitford report that
data was not always available with which to classify firms as "shattered" or not. It thus remains
[VOL. 72:955
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These results show that Chapter 11 is not sparing bankrupt firms from
being bought or sold in our imperfect and expensive markets, or from
liquidating assets in those markets, and that rehabilitation was unqualifiedly
accomplished33 in only twenty-one percent of the megabankruptcies
LoPucki and Whitford studied. Even so, LoPucki and Whitford were
unable to attribute even these modest successes to Chapter 11: "Of course,
it is entirely possible that financial rehabilitation could have been achieved
even more successfully or at lesser cost by some other procedure, but that
conclusion would be difficult to establish empirically." 4
A review of another recent study of the postconfirmation performance of
197 public companies filing Chapter 11 concludes: "The evidence does not
indicate that the Chapter 11 reorganization plays an effective role in
rehabilitating distressed firms."3" The data on court-supervised reorgani-
zations for smaller, unlisted firms over the same time period were similarly
embarrassing to the rehabilitative thesis. Apparently only about seventeen
percent of such firms ever even reach the stage of confirmed plans,36 and
about one-third of the confirmed plans are liquidating plans, leaving a net
possible that the 43 firms from which the 9 successful surviving firms figure is inferred include some
firms which shattered, but which were not recognized by LoPucki and Whitford as shattered due to the
unavailability of other information. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 14, at 603 n.22, 605.
33. Professor Whitford, in conversations and correspondence with me, had urged a point from
these numbers that was not clearly argued in the work from which the numbers are taken, but which
is suggested in his contribution to this Symposium. William C. Whitford, What's Right.About Chapter
11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379 (1994). The point is this: some of the firms which were liquidated were
actually sold off as operating businesses, and thus might be classified as financially rehabilitated in the
process as well. However, the evidence that these successful rehabilitations-by-sale would or could not
have occurred in a Chapter 7, or even in the market for corporate control entirely outside of bankruptcy
law has not yet been systematically assembled by any of Chapter I l's proponents, a point Whitford
seems to have recognized in empirical work he has done on the question. See infra text accompanying
note 34.
34. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 14, at 609 n.49. Difficult or not, the Slovin et al. study,
supra note 17, provides some interesting empirical evidence relevant to the question. Their results from
examining a larger sample of publicly traded debtors suggest that if there is any real rehabilitation going
on out there, it is the market, and not Chapter 11, which ought to get the credit. "Thus, our evidence
indicates that firms that emerge from bankruptcy via a stand-alone reorganization without having
received a control bid have a very high rate (47%) of post-exit failure. This suggests that, in the
absence of control bids, the effectiveness of bankruptcy proceedings as a mechanism for rehabilitating
financially distressed firms is questionable." Id. at 25.
35. Edith S. Hotchkiss, The Post-Bankruptcy Performance of Firms Emerging from Chapter 11,
50 J. FiN. (forthcoming 1995) (finding that 40% of emerging firms continued in financial distress, with
over 16% filing Chapter I I again).
36. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 14, at 601 n.13; Warren, Policymak-ing, supra note 25,
at 373 n.98.
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rehabilitation rate at a maximum level in the neighborhood of ten per-
cent.37 Thus, the rehabilitative form of the redistributive hypothesis is
undermined as a plausible theoretical justification for Chapter 11 by the
weakness of the empirical support for any claim that it is accomplishing its
alleged justificatory purposes. Indeed, Professor Warren, one of the
rehabilitative hypothesis's most prominent proponents, concludes that the
data are so discouraging for the thesis that Chapter 1 l's justification must
be sought elsewhere 38-which brings us to our next hypothesis.
II. THE PURE REDISTRIBUTIVE HYPOTHESIS
Even if Chapter 11 bankruptcies are not accomplishing indirect
redistributions through rehabilitations, the possibility exists that they
accomplish redistribution more directly. Chapter 11 may be taking the
assets of bankrupt firms away from the undeserving rich and giving them
to the deserving poor. Although redistributing the assets of failing firms
seems like a peculiar way to assist poor people, the case for a redistributive
explanation for Chapter 11 has some impressive foundations. Congress39
and the U.S. Supreme Court,4" for example, both seem to have espoused
a redistributive position. Bankruptcy law imposes an explicit priority
scheme.41  To doubt the law's redistributive intent, then, will inevitably
give a lawyer pause. On the other hand, a lawyer is likely to want to know
a good deal more about bankruptcy law's redistributive policy mandates
than he is likely to find in the formulations of those principles by those
who are advancing them.42
37. See Warren, Policymaking, supra note 25, at 373 n.99.
38. Id. at 374-75 ("The bankruptcy process nonetheless had a significant impact on the businesses
that filed for chapter 11 but never confirmed a reorganization plan. The distributional objectives of the
Code were clearly in play.").
39. "[R]eorganization, in its fundamental aspects, involves the thankless task of determining who
should share the losses incurred by an unsuccessful business and how the value of the estate should be
apportioned among creditors and shareholders." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5796.
40. See supra note 24 (discussing United Savings Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)).
41. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
42. This is particularly true with respect to reorganization bankruptcies in which distributions are
governed by plans forwhich terms are not mandated by the statute. See I I U.S.C. § 1141 (1988). The
distributions made under such plans are influenced by the sorting of the various claimants into differing
classes which will receive different treatment, but the guidelines for determining class membership are
exceedingly vague. For a discussion, see William Blair, Classification of Unsecured Claims in Chapter
11 Reorganizations, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1984).
[VOL. 72:955
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The credibility of a pure redistributive claim suffers from a basic doubt
that those desiring redistributive goals would choose to pursue them by
redistributing the assets of bankrupt firms. Most advocates for the
redistributive position have never been very explicit about who Chapter
1 's actual distributive beneficiaries are, or even who they ought to be.
This vagueness in their positions makes the distributive claim a difficult
one to evaluate empirically. Professor LoPucki does suggest that the well-
known losses to stockholders caused by Chapter 11 announcements could
be justified if Chapter 11 redistributed wealth from investors to trade and
bank creditors.43 Professor Warren is explicit in arguing that Chapter I l's
legislative intent is to take wealth from publicly traded claims and
redistribute it to holders of private debt.44 Jackson and Scott have also
argued that the wealth being redistributed ought to be that which belongs
to the secured creditors.4' The latest data we have on these questions seem
to show, however, that Chapter 11 does not provide any of those distribu-
tive outcomes, and raises serious empirical doubts about whether Chapter
11 is actually accomplishing much in the way of wealth redistributions.46
The pure redistributive claim is subject to serious theoretical objections
as well. The rights which bankruptcy legislation grants and takes away
from participants in Chapter 11 cases are mostly modifications of
expectations which arise from market exchanges.47 In truth, the partici-
pants in Chapter 11 bankruptcies are nearly all involved as the result of
consensual transactions. Since transaction costs were low enough to create
the relationship which led to the participation in the first instance, it is
likely that the relationships among the typical participants in Chapter 11
proceedings occur in an environment of relatively low transaction costs.
The Coase theorem48 holds that when transaction costs are low enough,
changes in legal rights do not effect the deployment of resources. Put
another way, if bankruptcy law changes the relative rights of prospective
43. LoPucki, supra note 7, at 85-88, 94.
44. Warren, supra note 9, at 469-71.
45. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 187-90 (1989) (claiming that apparent wealth
redistributions from secured creditors in favor of lower priority claimants is arguably justifiable as a
risk-sharing insurance measure).
46. See infra text accompanying note 54.
47. There are nonconsensual creditors in Chapter II proceedings, but no one is arguing that
Chapter I I is justified because it was designed to redistribute wealth either to or from these particular
parties. Nothing in Chapter 11, for example, limits the bankruptcy remedies and relief to debtors who
have nonconsensual creditors.
48. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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another way, if bankruptcy law changes the relative rights of prospective
transacting partners,49 they will alter the terms of their prospective deals
to contract around the legal alteration insofar as it is possible, if the costs
of the modifying transaction are low enough." Thus, if it is the intent of
Chapter 11, as Jackson and Scott assert, to dilute the legal rights of secured
creditors and redistribute the wealth associated with those rights to other
parties, then prospective secured lenders will charge more for the extension
of credit. It is likely to be almost impossible, then, to redistribute the
wealth of secured parties generally to any other group unless the transaction
costs associated with the striking of high interest rate secured loans are
significantly different from the costs of confecting lower rate loans.
This theoretical difficulty with the redistributive hypothesis is verified in
the results of my colleagues' 5' event study. 2 As of the time of this
Symposium, they had assembled a sample of 106 Chapter 11 announce-
ments by exchange-listed firms between 1980 and 1989. From reports in
the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, they were able to identify
266 creditors whose shares traded on stock exchanges associated with 81
of the bankrupt firms. The creditor claims were subdivided into 76
creditors with secured claims against 34 filing firms, and 190 unsecured
claims against 67 filing firms. Thirty-three of these latter claimants were
identifiable as trade creditors, the remainder being financial institutions.
These claimants and firms were further separated into two additional
categories: one in which the Chapter 11 proceedings were actually
concluded, and the other in which the petitioning firm's case was ultimately
converted to a Chapter 7 and it was liquidated. My colleagues then
computed the abnormal returns to the stocks of these various creditor firms
and the debtor firms themselves for the three-day period ending with the
49. That is, there may have been a one-time wealth redistribution in 1978 when Chapter I I was
adopted, which would have affected the relative wealths of parties bound to contracts at that time. The
point made here is thus limited to the cases of parties who contract with knowledge that Chapter II will
apply to their dealings.
50. This theoretical point is addressed in detail in Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the
Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (1974). The validity of the theory also seems to have been
empirically established for the effect Chapter I Is have in modifying the absolute priority rule. See
Eberhart et al., supra note 11 (confirming small deviations from absolute priority and finding that the
deviations were anticipated by investors ex ante).
51. Slovin et. al., supra note 17.
52. For an easily accessible but detailed description and analysis of the validity of event study
techniques, see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESsENTIALS OF FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT ch. 6 (1993).
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bankruptcy filing. 3  Their results provide a number of interesting
inferences about the plausibility of a pure redistributional thesis.
A convincing argument that pure redistribution is really meant to occur
in any bankruptcy reorganization, for example, must assume that those from
whom wealth is taken are likely to come from the highest nonbankruptcy
priority levels. Indeed, Jackson and Scott are explicit in asserting that it is
likely to be the secured creditors who will pay and the unsecured creditors
who will receive the redistributions. 4 If the proponents of pure redistri-
bution are correct, the announcement of bankruptcy filings ought to
produce significant negative impact on the values of high priority secured
creditors who will be taxed with paying out the redistribution. Likewise,
the value of the low priority creditors ought to be increased (or at
minimum, adversely affected to a significantly lesser extent) if they will be
the beneficiaries of significant redistributions.
The findings are, however, exactly to the contrary. The market predicts
that the value of the rights that secured creditors will receive as a result of
any bankruptcy is approximately equal to the nonbankruptcy value of the
secured creditors' claims.5 On the other hand, unsecured creditors, who
53. My colleagues' study first constructed a measure of the "normal" fluctuation of the shares of
the debtor firms and creditor firms with respect to the market during a period several months in advance
of the bankruptcy announcements. The measure of normal fluctuation relative to the market is
technically named the "Beta" ratio. A firm whose share value normally goes up 1% when the market
advances 1% or down 1% with a market decline in that amount has a Beta of I. See GILsON & BLACK,
supra note 52, at 99-104. Their study then compared the fluctuations of the same shares during the
three-day event period with the normal returns. This technique thus uses the market itself, and the
normal behavior of the stocks being followed, as a control group. The fluctuations that exceeded the
normal Betas were used to arrive at an estimate of the effect on the market of the news that one of the
creditor firm's debtors had declared bankruptcy. The abnormal returns, the only part of the stock's
movement that cannot be explained by the forces which cause changes in the values of the stock market
as a whole, are thus the market's unbiased prediction of the effect the bankruptcy will have on the
creditor firms. Slovin et al., supra note 17.
54. See supra note 45.
55. In fact, the shares of secured creditors do suffer abnormal declines in the three-day window
ending with the debtor firms' bankruptcy announcements, but these declines are near zero (-0.02% when
debtor firms reorganize in Chapter 11), and are not statistically significant. Slovin et al., supra note
17, at 18. Technically then, the deviations from zero could, likely as not, have occurred by chance
alone.
The situation that received academic attention and raised the issue of whether Chapter 11 was
inefficiently devaluing the claims of secured creditors almost always involved undersecured creditors.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,
51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984). The data reported here are consistent with the assumption that secured
creditors, aware ex ante of this effect of Chapter II, are simply taking much more care to remain
oversecured. The costs of these provisions of Chapter II then, are felt in the reduction in the quantity
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fall in the bottom priority level, are almost fifty times more adversely
affected than are secured creditors,56 and the negative impacts on the
values of their securities when their debtors declare bankruptcy is
statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence. The market thus
seems to be predicting that the unsecured creditors' contracts, which require
them to absorb the losses of the bankrupt debtor's ventures, will be
enforced against them. In short, the market seems to think that the high
priority claimants will not be forced to redistribute much value to the lower
priority claimants. And likewise, the market does not seem to be predicting
that the position of low priority claimants will be improved because their
claims will now be dealt with in a Chapter 11 proceeding.
While violations of the absolute priority rule have been documented in
reorganization proceedings, 7 the market seems to have discounted the
value it assigns to the creditor for this effect long in advance of the time
of the bankruptcy announcement. Such losses as the violations of
contracted-for priority do impose on creditors ex post are thus likely to
have been impounded into the price of the credit ex ante. 8 While the
evidence is not conclusive, the pure redistributional hypothesis seems to be
belied by a reasonable interpretation of the data we now have on the
question.
III. ZEROING IN ON A BANKRUPTCY THEORY
The most widely replicated finding in the empirical literature about
bankruptcy reorganization is that equity in filing firms loses a huge
of secured credit available to debtors. After some initial doubts, see Alan Schwartz, Security Interests
and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1982), there seems
to be a growing consensus that secured lending serves valuable functions, and can be justified as an
efficient practice. Bowers, Murphy II, supra note 5, at 57-68; F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision,
61 UMKC L. REV. 243,284 (1992); Hideki Kanda & Saul X. Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities,
80 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994). Thus, the loss of borrowing capacity to debtors is potentially a
seriously inefficient outcome. Indeed, this reduction in the borrowing power of debtors might credibly
be considered a matter of concern for those who view corporate reorganizations as a response to
insufficient liquidity of the debtor firms. Had their borrowing power not been cut back by Chapter 11,
debtors might have used secured borrowing to escape their liquidity crises.
56. Mean negative returns to all unsecured creditors of filing debtor firms whose Chapter I 1 plans
are eventually confirmed are -0.95%. Slovin et al., supra note 17, at 1.
57. See Eberhart et al., supra note 11; Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs
and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 285 (1990). Absolute priority does not seem to
be honored in the terms of nonbankruptcy workouts either. Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, How
Firms Fare in workouts and Chapter 11 Reorganizations (1991) (unpublished manuscript), quoted in
Managing Financial Distress and Valuing Distressed Securities: A Survey and Research Agenda, FIN.
MGMT., Autumn 1993, at 60, 71 (Kose John ed.).
58. See Eberhart et al., supra note 11.
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proportion of its value relative to the market in an astonishingly short
period surrounding the bankruptcy filing date. Bradley and Rosenzweig,
for example, report that in the five-day window ending at the filing date,
filing firms lose approximately 30% of their value relative to the market as
a whole.59 If markets are capable of generating unbiased estimates of firm
values, this result is astonishing-unless in the cases of most bankrupt
firms, the filing is linked to a discovery that the expected demand for the
firm's output has abruptly shrunk or that its expected production costs have
suddenly taken a huge jump. Since the studies seem to show that filing
firms experience large and continuous losses for the two or three years
preceding their filing,6" and that impending defaults are frequently
announced publicly long before any bankruptcy filings,6 the theory that
a sudden change occurs in the markets for the firm's inputs and outputs
seems implausible.62 What then might explain the sudden dramatic losses
which the financial studies observe?
The drop might evidence the fact that Chapter 1 1 will redistribute the
property of the equityholders to some other stakeholder group. Bradley and
Rosenzweig, for example, identify managements as the transferees.63 Both
economic theory and the available evidence discussed above cast serious
59. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at 1093 tbl. A.3. This finding has frequently been
replicated. See sources cited supra note 11. Slovin et al., supra note 17, break down this finding into
additional informative categories which will be discussed below. See infra text following note 74.
60. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzwieg, supra note 6, at 1065 tbl. 5; Michael Bradley & H. Nejat
Seyhun, Corporate Bankruptcy and Insider Trading, tbls. I & II (July 1993) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
61. Gilson et al., supra note I1, at 329 (identifying prebankruptcy events which gave notice of
actual or impending defaults in a large sample of firms which either restructured privately or filed for
Chapter 11).
62. Indeed, for many firms, the market seems able to predict that bankruptcy proceedings will
occur in the future, well in advance of the announcement that the firm has actually filed. See, e.g., infra
text following note 72. Bradley and Seyhun described their findings as follows:
Our finding that corporate insiders sell their holdings prior to filing bankruptcy is
inconsistent with the notion that corporate managers are unexpectedly thrust into Chapter 11.
The fact that there are absolutely no trades in the 30 days preceding a filing suggests that
managers have at least a one-month lead-time. We also find that prior to filing, the insiders
of filing firms sell significantly more shares than the insiders of firms that experience
financial distress but do not file a bankruptcy petition. This suggests that filing is a more
accurately anticipated (endogenous) event than other events that cause a significant fall in a
firm's stock price. . . . Our results indicate that 1) filing bankruptcy is a strategic,
management decision; 2) corporate managers understand the effect that filing will have on
their firm's stock price and they sell their holdings in order to avoid significant capital losses;
and 3) the interests of managers and stockholders are less aligned in a bankruptcy proceeding
than they are under more normal circumstances.
Bradley & Seyhun, supra note 60, at 4-5.
63. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at 1049.
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doubts on the validity of redistributive explanations, however. That leaves
only two competing explanations from which to choose. Consequently,
narrowing the choice between these explanations should be the top priority
on the bankruptcy research agenda.
In order to understand these alternatives, consider the following model:
V = p(V) + Pb(Vb)
Where:
V = the market value of the firm's equity;
p,= the anticipated probability that an out-of-bankruptcy-court
workout or liquidation will occur;
V = the anticipated present value of the income stream that the firm
will earn after the out-of-bankruptcy resolution;
Pb = the anticipated probability of a Chapter 11 reorganization or
bankruptcy liquidation;
Vb = the anticipated present value of the firm's prospective income
stream after the bankruptcy results; and
P. + Pb = 1
The one thing we know for sure is that when the firm files bankruptcy,
p, suddenly drops to zero and Pb suddenly grows to equal 1. Thus, the
impact of V,, on the market price is totally eliminated. The sudden drop in
V can be explained in only two ways. First, we could assume that Vb = V
(more or less)' and that the filing of a Chapter 11 petition signals the
existence of private unfavorable information about both values such that,
on average, bankrupt firms were all drastically overvalued by the market
on the date of the filing. I will refer to this explanation as the "overvalu-
ation" hypothesis. The competing possibility is that V, #: Vb, in which case
if V declines, then V , > Vb, an explanation which I denominate the
"dissipative" hypothesis. I shall first consider the dissipative hypothesis
before considering the evidence for the overvaluation hypothesis in detail
below.
64. Gilson et al., supra note 11, at 344, find as an empirical fact that the losses to firms which
resolve their problems privately are significantly smaller than the losses to firms using Chapter 11, a
finding which suggests that V, > V, and is therefore inconsistent with an assumption that the two
values are (roughly) equal to each other. In this regard, see also Robert J. Gertner & David Sharfstein,
A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Lmv, 46 J. FIN. 1189 (1991), and Stuart Gilson,
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A. The Dissipative Hypothesis
Some have suggested that Vb should exceed V, because, among other
reasons, Chapter 11 permits debtor-in-possession financing, which can act
as a cure for the well-known Myers underinvestment incentive hypothesis:
that the firm's equityholders will underinvest in net positive present value
projects because they must share the gains with the preexisting creditors.6"
The model presented here, however, suggests that if this justification for
Chapter 11 was in fact widespread in its application, we would rarely see
the declines in V which the studies find.
On the other hand, if bankrupt firms are more likely to be subject to the
converse of the Myers effect, the so-called Jensen and Meckling risk-
alteration effect (under which equity is likely to undertake risky gambles
with the creditors' money'), Vb would be expected to be less than V, and
the drop in V would be understandable. Indeed, I hypothesize that the very
act of filing Chapter 11 is itself a risk alteration. The common sense
source of this instinct is obvious: investors control their agents' gambling
propensities by adopting protective contractual terms. The universal
implied term is: if you default, then I come and take the assets away (so
you will not be able to gamble with them). Chapter 11, if it accomplishes
one thing, emphatically repeals the effects of such contract terms for
considerable periods of time.67 The risk-alteration hypothesis is also a
credible explanation for why managements file Chapter 11 despite the
significant drop in V that the filing will likely cause.6"
The risk-alteration explanation for the drop in V can be recast in terms
of the creation of the environment for rent-seeking. Imagine a regime in
which, when you and I are disputing our boundary line, the law suspends
65. George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-ln-Possession Financing, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 901 (1993). This explanation may account for some of the small proportion (7%) of firms
whose equity securities rise in value during the short event windows surrounding their bankruptcy filing
announcements in the findings of Slovin, Sushka, and Waller. Slovin et al., supra note 17, at 16.
66. This incentive works from the realization that the low priority residual claimants capture gains
from taking large risks, while the losses are placed on the higher priority claimants. Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
67. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) (imposing an automatic stay or injunction against any
creditor action to take away assets).
68. In other words, managements will opt for Chapter I I only in cases in which a desperate
gamble (with someone else's money) with only a faint hope of some success is the best available
alternative for equityholders. Thus, one would expect to see only a small portion of Chapter 1 Is
"succeed," a view that finds considerable support in the data. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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the previous surveys and deeds under which the boundary was initially
established and replaces them with an interim rule which holds that the
boundary is now plus or minus 60 feet from the line passing between our
respective driveways. I will now take steps to gain control over the full 60
feet north of where I had previously stopped mowing, and you will expend
a lot of resources trying to acquire my garage. In the course of our
dispute, we can be expected to dissipate much of the value of the 120-foot-
wide strip of land in such activity. Something not too different from that
behavior occurs in Chapter 11 proceedings. If equity's contractual rights
have all been lost by declines in the fortunes of the business, then
competing in a rent-seeking arena offers equity the only attractive
alternative to simply writing off the preexisting losses. All previous
contract and property rights are put in suspension by the automatic stay and
a process to establish new rights commences in which outcomes are
variable to the extent of the significant discretion of the bankruptcy court.
The filing of the Chapter 11 thus announces to the world that the value of
the firm is about to be significantly dissipated. To restate the problem in
terms of still another vocabulary, the effect of many of Chapter I l's
provisions is to raise transaction costs by making the enforcement of
preexisting property rights expensive.69 A drastic increase in transaction
costs explains the drop in V for filing firms unless the equity of almost all
bankrupt firms is substantially and systematically overvalued by the market,
a prospect which is questioned below.
B. The Overvaluation Hypothesis
The semi-strong version of the efficient markets hypothesis holds that
actual market values are unbiased assessments of value in light of the
publicly available information.7" The market price, then, may "overval-
ue" the firm, considering that unfavorable but private information might
exist about the firm's prospects. Accordingly, the Chapter 11 filing may
be viewed as some sort of a signal that such information exists. The filing
itself, however, does not give the market's players much to go on in
deciding by how much they should reduce the values of their bids. An
investor needs to know more than that a stock is overvalued. She needs to
decide by how much. Thus, the simple fact that derogatory private
69. Douglas Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1991) (arguing that
transaction costs are the costs of enforcing property rights).
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information, which is not accurately accounted for in prefiling market
values, might exist is not a very satisfying explanation for the relatively
precipitous drop in securities prices over the very brief periods surrounding
a bankruptcy filing.
Undoubtedly, there are cases in which negative private information can
explain significant overvaluations. The firm which has invested and
borrowed heavily to develop a promising but speculative potential prospect
(e.g., the drug that cures lung cancer in rats) and finds out after having
made the investment that the prospect does not live up to its previous
promise (because, for example, its curative potency turns out to be rat-
specific-it cured laboratory rats, but was ineffective in people) may owe
much of its market value to the prospect, and the filing can be seen as a
signal that the prospect did not pan out.
None of the "thick description" work done on failing firms, however, has
reported that, as a group, they share characteristics like these. Indeed, had
any studies shown that bankruptcy was actually a signal that the firm's
projects all had negative net present value, the case for Chapter 11 would
not have been established. Firms whose investments cannot be made
profitable are economically inviable, and not merely financially distressed.
No set of legal rules or institutions is going to save such firms. A
reorganization of their financial affairs and capital structure will not make
such firms economically viable.
There is another reason to question whether, if distressed firms are
actually overvalued by the capital market, an administrative resolution of
their problems in a proceeding like Chapter 11 is justifiable. Firms with
shares which are overvalued by financial markets are the very ones which,
it seems reasonable to expect, would sell equity claims against themselves
for more than those claims are actually worth, and thus raise from the
market a significant profit from the overvaluation. Overvalued firms are
the very ones which markets ought to be able to assist best in the process
of recapitalizing, and accordingly, ought to consist of the class which least
needs administered legal remedies.
Finally, there is a growing amount of empirical evidence and theoretical
analysis which is inconsistent with an overvaluation hypothesis. Filing
firms usually have been in default of many of their obligations or have sent
out other negative signals for a significant period of time before a crisis
arises which demands a Chapter II filing. Many bankrupt firms' troubles
have been reported in the newspapers (or in the SEC's 10K files) days and
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weeks (or even, in cases like Robins or Manville, years) before the
filing.7 In such cases, the overvaluation hypothesis requires that the
marginal buyers and sellers who set the prefiling market prices must be
assuming that there is private favorable information (e.g., that management
has a promising strategy for dealing with the known problems) that causes
the overvaluation.
On the other hand, the market might rationally assume that if there is any
private good news, the firm will find it in its own interest to disclose the
information. Thus, investors should rationally assume that any private
information is likely to be unfavorable, and should discount their willing-
ness to bid in the market by the appropriate amount for unknown
unfavorable information. Just what amount is added to the discount they
might make on account of unspecified unfavorable private information
signalled by a Chapter 11 filing is a mystery, unexplained by the overvalu-
ation hypothesis.
Also, it seems reasonable to believe that in many, if not most cases, the
determinants of V are difficult to keep secret for long periods from earnest
information seekers. A significant portion of the firm's anticipated value
is doubtlessly estimated by investors as functions of the market demand for
the firm's outputs and the market supplies of its inputs. Neither of those
types of information is likely to remain wholly in the private domain of the
firm over long periods of time, particularly for the large number of firms
in the industries documented in the studies showing drastic drops in actual
V
Finally, studies also cast empirical doubt on the overvaluation hypothesis.
Bi and Levy72 recently published a study on how the announcement of
bond downgradings affected the value of the downgraded firm's stock.
They report that the effects were significantly more severe for firms which
ultimately filed for Chapter 11 than for firms which did not. Gilson, John,
and Lang also found that the market predicted which defaulting firms
would be able to work out their financial difficulties privately and which
would be obliged to use Chapter 11. They found the market penalized the
value of the latter firms more heavily at the time the default became
public.73 My colleagues obtained a similar result in the study reported
71. See Bradley & Seyhun, supra note 60; Gilson et al., supra note 61.
72. Keqian Bi & Haim Levy, Market Reaction to Bond Downgradings Followed by Chapter 11
Filings, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1993, at 156 (1993).
73. Gilson et al., supra note 11.
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above.74 Slovin, Sushka, and Waller not only measured the announcement
effects on creditors of the filing firms, but also the effects on the firms
themselves, and then disaggregated those findings for the ultimate
bankruptcy outcomes. In the three days ending with the bankruptcy
announcement, firms which eventually had Chapter 11 plans confirmed saw
their shares shrink in value only two-thirds as much as the decline in value
of firms eventually liquidated under Chapter 7.75
The Slovin study also shows similar results by disaggregating firms for
which control bids were received in bankruptcy proceedings from those for
which no such bids were received. It shows that at the time bankruptcy is
filed, the firms receiving bids in the Chapter 11 proceedings suffered
significantly smaller negative abnormal negative returns (mean = -21.41%)
than did those for whom no bids were received (mean = -35.86%).76 This
latter result is consistent with the dissipative hypothesis, because the receipt
of an outside bid constrains the discretion exercised by the bankruptcy
judge in valuing the firm. To use my previous boundary line metaphor, it
reduces the width of the land in contention between you and me from 120
feet to, say 50 feet, and thus reduces the potential rent-seeking losses.
These studies seem to show that the market knows a great deal about the
proper amount by which the equity of distressed firms should be devalued.
Not only does the market accurately predict when an unparticularized
announcement of bad news is likely to lead to a cure at the vet's office on
the one hand, or the need to send the critter to the glue factory on the
other, but also it predicts, at the time when the critter enters the slaughter-
ing pen, just what the future price of the glue will be. The assumptions
underlying any credible overvaluation hypothesis must include the
proposition that firms will be able to easily keep unfavorable information
private. Among the sorts of unfavorable information which one would
expect to fall into that class would be the information determinative not
only of the likelihood that bankruptcy will eventuate, but also of eventual
bankruptcy outcomes. The market seems, nevertheless, to detect consider-
able heterogeneity among failing firms and to value them in accordance
with their ultimate financial prospects, even in the teeth of the assumptions
which the overvaluation hypothesis requires us to reject.
74. Slovin et al., supra note 17; see also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
75. The mean negative return to shares of the "successful" Chapter 11 firms was -24.8%. The
mean negative return to firms whose cases were eventually converted to Chapter 7 liquidations was
-39.5%. Slovin et al., supra note 17, at 16.
76. These findings are discussed supra in the text accompanying note 16.
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Why then should we be willing to accept a similar assumption that the
market seems to considerably overvalue firms because they can keep
private information that, on the average, determines about one-third of their
ultimate value at the margins? In order for the overvaluation hypothesis to
be credible, an additional theory is required that predicts the kinds of
unfavorable information that firms are likely to be able to keep private, and
that shows how the information which appears to determine values in the
bankruptcy contingency differs so that it can be determined by the market.
In short, the semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis, on the current state
of the theory, is necessarily a lot stronger than the conservative instincts of
finance scholars seem to have imagined. It is not likely, on the evidence
we now have, that the filing of a Chapter 11 petition is some sort of
reliable publication of previously private, unfavorable information about the
firm (except the private information that the firm has chosen to subject its
investors to the wealth-destroying mechanism we call Chapter 11).
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS
The simultaneous existence of various alternative explanations about the
purpose and effect of corporate reorganization law is indicative of a
fundamental philosophical void: no one has a good explanation for why
we have such a law, nor even much of a credible vision about what sorts
of benefits such a law is capable of bringing to society. We are consider-
ing various possibilities precisely because we do not have any very good
ideas about where we stand. The raising, evaluating, and refining of
hypotheses is a description of the process of intellectual progress, however.
Perhaps the day is at hand when we can develop a paradigm that lets us all
understand reorganization bankruptcies.
On the information which is presently available to us, we must conclude
that Chapter 11 cannot be justified as a business rehabilitation measure. It
rarely works to rehabilitate firms, and investors in those firms which use
markets rather than bankruptcy proceedings to rehabilitate themselves are
invariably made much better off. It cannot be justified as a device to
relieve distressed firms from the necessity of using our imperfect capital
and asset markets to resolve their problems. The evidence is that firms
must and do use those markets even within Chapter 11, and furthermore,
investors in firms whose bankruptcy leaves them in play in the market for
corporate control come out much better than do investors in firms who are
never put up for sale. In summary, markets seem to be the only available
devices which really do solve the problems of financial distress. The
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bureaucratic mechanisms created by the Bankruptcy Code result in larger
losses and confer few benefits to any participants other than those
successful in playing rent-seeking games. In short, markets are efficient
and bankruptcy procedures are not. That is the lesson of the only
systematic and rigorous theory that has been applied to the problem, and
the implications of the only scientific empirical evidence.
Even those who are persuaded that Chapter 11 is inefficient, however,
might be able to understand it (and therefore be able to sensibly apply it in
discrete cases) if it were an effective device for redistributing income.
There are theoretical reasons to doubt that Chapter 11 could ever be a
successful device to obtain redistributional ends, however, and the available
evidence seems to show that the Bankruptcy Code is a flop as a wealth
redistributor.
Nevertheless, the process of searching for a coherent, credible justifica-
tion for Chapter 11 is itself illuminating. The set of property and contract
rights which bankruptcy law works to alter or overturn comprises the
fundamentals of our system of private property. The burden on those who
advocate overturning such long-established institutions ought to be
significant, particularly when the available data furnish the strongest
support of hypotheses that court-supervised corporate reorganization is
wealth-destroying. It is right to insist then, that the apologists for the law
offer an explanatory hypothesis which is normatively attractive, theoretical-
ly coherent, and also conforms to the facts in the world (or even points to
a successful historical instance of state-mandated collectives) before we
grant anyone the point that our current corporate bankruptcy law is worth
having. Those having discretion to use bankruptcy power to overturn
nonbankruptcy arrangements, accordingly, ought to employ their authority
with great humility, if not timidity, until someone comes up with a widely
understood and acceptable explanation for the law, and with it a justifica-
tion for the exercise of that power.
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